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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In Quaestor Investments, Inc. v. State of Chiapas,1 the supreme court
considered the issues that arise when a state court acquires jurisdiction
over a case that has been remanded by a federal court. After a default
judgment had been entered, defendant removed the case to federal court,
but it was eventually remanded to state court. Defendant then filed a
petition for writ of error in state court to set aside the default judgment.
Plaintiff contended that the application for writ of error was untimely,
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and the resolution of this contention depended upon when the state court
reacquired jurisdiction of the case after remand. The supreme court held
that jurisdiction revests in the state court when the federal district court
executes the remand order and mails a certified copy to the state court.2
According to the court, "there is no requirement that the state court take
any action (e.g., entering the order in the state court docket) to reassert
jurisdiction."'3
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Sweatt,4 the court of appeals con-
sidered a trial court's jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action. In
this case, an insurer sued its insured seeking a declaratory judgment that
the insured's claim was not a covered loss under the policy and that the
policy was void because the insured had made material misrepresenta-
tions in procuring it. The insured counterclaimed for breach of contract
and subsequently obtained an order from the trial court dismissing the
insurer's claims for declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. The court of
appeals, however, disagreed and held that insurer was entitled to a decla-
ration of the rights and liabilities of the parties under the policy and to
assert the claim for attorneys' fees under the declaratory judgment stat-
ute.5 The appellate court distinguished other cases where courts consid-
ered claims for declaratory relief by a plaintiff who also had claims for
remedies at law or in equity which were on file at the time they filed the
declaratory claims. The court also observed that, while it is improper for
a potential defendant to seek a declaratory judgment of non-liability in a
tort action, this principle did not apply to the present case because it was
a contract action. According to the court, construction and validity of
contracts "are the most obvious and common uses of the declaratory
judgment action."'6
The ability of a state court to enjoin a related federal court proceeding
was the subject of Bodine v. Webb.7 After an insurance company encoun-
tered severe financial difficulties, a state district court appointed a re-
ceiver and rendered a permanent injunction barring others from bringing
claims against the insurance company or the receiver outside of the re-
ceivership proceeding. Subsequently, appellants filed suit in federal dis-
trict court, invoking jurisdiction under the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 8 and claimed that the retire-
ment benefit plan of the insurance company had been mismanaged by a
number of parties, including the receiver. The receiver then sought and
obtained an order enforcing the prior injunction which enjoined the ap-
pellants from pursuing their federal lawsuit.
For a number of reasons, the court of appeals held that the state court
2. See id. at 229.
3. Id. at 228.
4. 978 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
5. See id. at 269.
6. Id. at 271.
7. 992 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1.001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998).
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did not have authority to enjoin the federal court proceeding. 9 First,
while state courts may maintain and exercise their jurisdiction over in
rem or quasi in rem proceedings to the exclusion of other courts, they
cannot enjoin a federal in personam action.10 The court of appeals deter-
mined that appellants' federal lawsuit was an in personam action because
it was not directly against the receivership property, but was brought to
secure a judgment against defendants that had mismanaged the retire-
ment plan. Further, the relief sought in the federal court proceeding
could well extend beyond any receivership property and could reach the
individual defendants' assets, which further indicated that the federal
lawsuit was in personam. Second, the court noted that to enjoin a federal
suit, a state court must have jurisdiction, at least, concurrent with the fed-
eral court. Noting that most ERISA suits are within the exclusive juris-
diction of the federal court, the court of appeals observed that a state
court's concurrent jurisdiction over ERISA claims by beneficiaries is lim-
ited to suits: (1) to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan; (2) to
enforce rights under the plan; or (3) to clarify rights to future benefits.11
Given that appellants' claims were for breach of fiduciary duty relating to
the administration of an ERISA plan, the court held that such claims fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and, therefore, the
state court could not enjoin appellants from proceeding in federal court.
Finally, in Arteaga v. Jackson,12 the court of appeals considered the
minimum amount-in-controversy that must exist in order to invoke the
district court's jurisdiction. As an initial matter, the court held that, as a
result of certain changes to Texas constitutional and statutory provisions,
the district court's minimum amount-in-controversy jurisdiction was re-
duced from $500 to $200.01.13 In this case, plaintiff alleged in his petition
that he was damaged in the amount of $200.00 but, in his prayer for relief,
he also sought recovery of $700 in treble damages. The court of appeals
analyzed his petition and determined that he had no viable claim for
treble damages, as his claim was essentially for breach of contract. Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the relief sought by the plaintiff was
an amount below the jurisdictional minimum of the district court and,
therefore, the case was properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction.14
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Rule 106 generally provides that process may be served upon a defen-
dant either in person or by mail. 15 Upon a motion supported by affidavit,
however, the trial court can authorize a substitute method of process.1 6
9. See Bodine, 992 S.W.2d at 678.
10. See id. at 676.
11. See id. at 677.
12. 994 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
13. See id.
14. See id. at 343.
15. See TEX. R. Cv. P. 106(a).
16. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 106(b).
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In Stankiewicz v. Oca,17 the trial court authorized substitute service by
leaving the citation at the defendant's residence with anyone over 16
years of age. Subsequent to this order, citation was served personally
upon the defendant. On appeal from a default judgment, the defendant
claimed that personal service was not valid because the trial court had
authorized a substitute means of service. The court of appeals rejected
this argument, noting that service in person is the preferred method. The
court of appeals held that "unless the trial court's order authorizing sub-
stitute service expressly states that substitute service is the exclusive
method, a preferred type of service [such as personal service] remains
available."18
Two cases during the Survey period addressed issues related to service
of process made through the Secretary of State. In Commercial Union
Assurance Co. v. Silva, 19 plaintiffs served their petition by serving the
Secretary of State and providing him with the address of the defendant
insurer, which was referenced in the insurance policy in question. The
court of appeals determined that the service was defective, because the
defendant insurance company had previously notified the Insurance
Commissioner of a new address for its agency, which was different than
the one originally shown in the policy.20 Even though the insureds were
not notified of this change in address, the appellate court still held that
the new address must be provided to the Secretary of State.
In 14850 Quorum Associates, Ltd. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.,21
plaintiff served a defendant partnership through the Secretary of State.
The court of appeals, however, concluded that a default judgment could
not stand because the record failed to demonstrate that service through
the Secretary of State was appropriate.22 In this connection, the applica-
ble statute provides that service on a Texas limited partnership through
the Secretary of State is proper only when (i) such partnership fails to
appoint or maintain a registered agent in Texas or the registered agent
cannot be found with reasonable diligence at the registered office, and
(ii) the general partner of the limited partnership cannot be found with
reasonable diligence.23 Here, plaintiff's petition alleged only that the de-
fendant partnership was a Texas limited partnership doing business in
Dallas County and could be served through the Secretary of State. The
record, however, did not show that the partnership had failed to appoint
or maintain a registered agent in Texas and that its general partner could
not be found with reasonable diligence. Under those circumstances, the
court held that the record did not contain facts demonstrating that the
17. 991 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
18. Id. at 311.
19. 988 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
20. See id. at 802.
21. 7 S.W.3d 166 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.).
22. See id. at 169.
23. See TEX. R. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 § 1.08(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998).
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partnership was amenable to service through the Secretary of State.24
In Barker CATV Construction, Inc. v. Ampro, Inc.,25 an en banc Hous-
ton Court of Appeals decided to whom citation must be directed. Rule
9926 provides that citation shall "be directed to the defendant." On the
other hand, Rule 1527 provides that "unless otherwise expressly provided
by law or these rules, every writ and process shall be directed to any sher-
iff or any constable within the State of Texas." The en banc court harmo-
nized these two rules by holding that a citation may be directed to both
the sheriff or constable, as the officer serving it, and the defendant as the
person being served.28 The court, however, indicated that a citation di-
rected only to the sheriff or constable (and not to the defendant as well)
would be defective. Although the en banc court determined that the cita-
tion was not defective since it was directed to both the officer serving it
and the defendant, a panel of the court, which decided the remaining
issues on appeal, concluded that the return of service did not support the
default judgment.29 In this connection, the return reflected that service
was made upon the defendant corporation (Barker CATV Construction)
by serving it on "James Barker." The panel concluded, however, that the
return of service should have reflected that it was delivered to the defen-
dant corporation "through its registered agent James M. Barker." In
short, according to the court, "James Barker" on the original return did
not establish that the person served was, in fact, the defendant's agent for
service of process nor did it establish that the defendant corporation was
served. Rather, the original return showed only that a person named
"James Barker" was served with a petition in which he was not sued.
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Two cases addressed an issue that often arises in the personal jurisdic-
tion context, namely, whether a defendant waives its special appearance
challenging jurisdiction by taking other, inconsistent action in the trial
court. In Transportes Aereos de Coahuila, S.A. v. Falcon,30 the trial court
had entered a default judgment against an Mexican airline even though a
special appearance had been filed prior to the entry of such judgment.
After the Mexican airline requested a hearing on its special appearance
and a hearing had been set, the parties filed an agreed motion for new
trial related to the default judgment and the trial court subsequently en-
tered an order setting it aside. Distinguishing an earlier supreme court
24. 14850 Quorum Assoc., 7 S.W.3d at 169.
25. 989 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
26. TEX. R. Civ. P. 99.
27. TEX. R. Civ. P. 15.
28. See Ampro, 989 S.W.2d at 792.
29. Id. at 792-93; see Verlander Enterprises, Inc. v. Graham, 932 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.
App.-El Paso, no writ); Bavarian Autohaus, Inc. v. Holland, 570 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ).
30. 5 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.).
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case, 31 which had found a waiver of the special appearance as a result of
the filing of a motion for a new trial, the court of appeals in Falcon noted
that in the present action, the agreed motion contained no statement an-
nouncing that the defendant was ready to try the case, and there was no
evidence that a hearing was requested or held on the motion before the
special appearance was heard.32 There was likewise no evidence that the
defendant had approved the order granting the new trial. Accordingly,
the court held there was no waiver of the special appearance. 33
In GFTA v. Varme,34 the supreme court considered the issue of
whether a defendant consented to personal jurisdiction by including in its
special appearance a challenge to the method of serving citation. In this
case, the defendant filed an instrument entitled "Verified Special Appear-
ance and, Subject to Special Appearance, its Motion to Dismiss." In that
pleading, defendant contested personal jurisdiction on the basis that it
lacked minimum contacts with Texas and also claimed that it was not
amenable to service because the method of service violated various con-
stitutional, foreign law, and procedural provisions. The supreme court
concluded that defendant had not waived its personal jurisdiction chal-
lenge by also attacking the method of service. 35 Although the court rec-
ognized that a mere challenge to the method of service alone fails as a
special appearance and constitutes a general appearance, it held that a
party does not waive its personal jurisdiction challenge by also contesting
the method of service in its special appearance.36
IV. VENUE
In In re Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,3 7 the Texas Supreme Court out-
lined the criteria for determining where a corporation's principal place of
business is located. In this Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA")
suit, plaintiff asserted that, under the relevant venue statute,38 venue was
proper because the defendant's principal office in Texas was located in
the county where the suit was filed. Initially, the supreme court consid-
ered the issue of whether a corporation may have more than one princi-
pal office in Texas for venue purposes. The court observed that this issue
was complicated due to the language in various provisions of the venue
statute.39 The FELA venue statute provided for suit "in the county
where the defendant's principal place of office in this state is located."
On the other hand, the general definition of "principal office" in
31. See Liberty Enters., Inc. v. Moore Transp. Co., 690 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1985).
32. Falcon, 5 S.W.3d at 716-17.
33. See id.
34. 991 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1999).
35. See id. at 786.
36. See id. at 786-87.
37. 998 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999).
38. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.618.
39. See In re Missouri Pacific, 998 S.W.2d at 216.
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§ 15.00140 defines principal office as "a principal office of the corporation
... in the state in which the decision makers for the organization within
this state conduct the daily affairs of the organization." The court con-
cluded that in light of the latter definition, a corporation can have more
than one principal office for venue purposes, but the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that a principal office can be any place where a com-
pany official makes decisions about the company's business.41 In this
connection, the court noted that such a broad definition would include
agencies or representatives and, under the venue statute, the mere pres-
ence of an agency or representative does not establish a principal office. 42
Accordingly, the court concluded that "decision makers" who "conduct
the daily affairs" are officials of a different order than agents or repre-
sentatives.43 The court also determined that an office clearly subordinate
to and controlled by another Texas office could not be a principal office
and that the "daily affairs" of a company cannot mean relatively com-
mon, low-level managerial decisions. 44 In short, the court decided that
"principal office" means the location where there are "decision makers"
who conduct the "daily affairs" of the company on a day-to-day basis, and
their decisions must be of a higher level than typically made by an agent
or representative.45
The court further held that to establish a prima facie case that a corpo-
ration has a principal office in the county of suit, a party must offer evi-
dence of the corporate structure and the authority of the officers in the
county of the suit as compared with the remainder of the state.46 In this
case, the evidence showed that the corporate employee in the county of
suit was "not an executive officer" and had the least authority of any of
the corporate decision makers located within the state.47 In contrast, the
evidence demonstrated that there were, at least, six executive officers lo-
cated in a different county who conducted the company's railroad opera-
tions, oversaw legal affairs, and made higher-level decisions related to the
operation of the company's railroads. 48 Under those circumstances, the
court held that the corporation did not have a principal place of business
in the county of suit and, therefore, venue was improper.49
Several cases wrestled with venue issues under § 15.003 of the venue
statute, which governs suits in which multiple plaintiffs seek to maintain
venue in a single county. 50 In general, this statute provides that, in a suit
where more than one plaintiff is joined, each plaintiff must, indepen-
40. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.001(a).
41. See In re Missouri Pacific, 998 S.W.2d at 216.
42. See id.; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.001(a).
43. Id. at 217.
44. In re Missouri Pacific, 998 S.W.2d at 217.
45. Id. at 219.
46. See id. at 220.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 221.
49. See id.
50. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a).
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dently of any other plaintiff, establish proper venue.5 1 A plaintiff who is
unable to independently establish proper venue may not join in the suit
unless certain requirements are met, including a showing that there is an
essential need to have the plaintiff's claim tried in the county in which the
suit is pending.5 2 In Surgitek Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel,5 3 the supreme
court held, in addressing whether these requirements have been met, the
trial court has discretion to allow a broader range of proof than in a typi-
cal venue hearing.54 Specifically, the trial court may allow the parties to
offer testimony. Further, the court may consider all evidence, both the
plaintiff's and defendant's, and is not restricted to making its venue deter-
mination based solely on whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie
case for joinder. In this case, the court concluded that the plaintiffs in
question had not established that there was an essential need to have
their claims tried in the county in which the suit was pending. In this
regard, plaintiffs' claimed need to pool their resources against common
experts and on common issues was held to be insufficient. 55
Similarly, in Blaylock Prescription Center v. Lopez-Guerra,56 the court
held that the plaintiffs in question had not met the requirements of
§ 15.003 for a number of reasons. In this case, two plaintiffs sued for
alleged injuries resulting from the use of a diet drug known as "fen/
phen." The suit was filed in the county where one of the plaintiffs resided
and had purchased the drug, and where her prescribing physician was
located. The other plaintiff resided in a different county, where she had
purchased the drug and her prescribing physician was located. On ap-
peal, the court of appeals held that the second plaintiff had not estab-
lished that she was entitled to join in the lawsuit. Initially, the court
noted that the second plaintiff had to establish that her joinder in the suit
was proper under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and, in turn, this
required her to demonstrate that there was a logical relationship between
the two claims, i.e., there was, at least, some facts which were relevant to
both claims. Here, while the legal claims may have been the same, the
two plaintiffs resided in different counties, were seen by different doctors
51. See id.
52. Section 15.003(a) provides:
In a suit where more than one plaintiff is joined each plaintiff must, independently of any
other plaintiff, establish proper venue. Any person who is unable to establish proper
venue may not join or maintain venue for a suit as a plaintiff unless the person, indepen-
dently of any other plaintiff, establishes that:
(1) joinder or intervention in the suit is proper under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure;
(2) maintaining venue in the county of suit does not unfairly prejudice another party to the
suit;(3) there is an essential need to have the person's claim tried in the county in which the suit
is pending; and(4) the county in which the suit is pending is a fair and convenient venue for the person
seeking to join in or maintain venue for the suit and the persons against whom the suit is
brought.
53. 997 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1999).
54. See id. at 602.
55. See id. at 603.
56. 986 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
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who prescribed different combinations of drugs over different periods of
time, and such drugs were produced by different manufacturers. Under
those circumstances, the court concluded that the joinder was not
proper.57
On the other hand, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Goldston58 the ap-
pellate court held that certain nonresident plaintiffs had established that
there was an essential need to have their products liability claims tried in
the county of suit. In this regard, plaintiffs offered evidence that they all
had the same treating physician who officed in the county of suit, all of
their fact and expert witnesses were residents "in or around" such county,
and they were all represented by the same attorney who averred that
there would be a three-year delay if the suit was transferred to the county
that defendant claimed was the proper forum.5 9 Along the same line,
plaintiffs in American Home Products Corp. v. Bernal60 met the require-
ments for joinder under § 15.003. In this fen/phen case, the court of ap-
peals determined that plaintiffs' claims arose from the same transaction
or occurrence, as each plaintiff claimed injury from the design, manufac-
ture, and marketing of fen/phen, and their claims arose out of the intro-
duction of the drug into the stream of commerce. 61 The court did not
find persuasive defendant's argument that common issues did not exist
because each plaintiff had distinct medical histories and received differ-
ent warnings from their treating physicians. The court of appeals also
ascertained no unfair prejudice to the defendants if the case was not
transferred. In this connection, plaintiffs had submitted affidavits that es-
tablished there would be no greater ability to subpoena witnesses if the
case was transferred, and that verdicts for plaintiffs and defendants in the
county of suit had been equally split. Finally, the court held that there
was an essential need to have the case tried in plaintiffs' choice of forum.
Relying on a detailed affidavit from plaintiffs' counsel, the court deter-
mined that the essential need existed because, given the economic reali-
ties involved in a lawsuit of this magnitude, it was apparent that plaintiffs
derived significant - even critical - benefits from pooling their resources.
62
Finally, in In re Masonite Corp.63 the supreme court considered
whether the trial court has any discretion to transfer plaintiffs' claims to
the counties of their choice after it has been determined that the criteria
of § 15.003 have not been met. In this case, after it was conceded that
certain of the plaintiffs could not meet the requirements of § 15.003, the
trial court transferred the claims of those plaintiffs to their counties of
residence. The defendant, however, had previously offered prima facie
57. See id. at 664; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 40.
58. 983 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
59. Id. at 376.
60. No. 13-99-089-CV, 1999 WL 640034 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 19, 1999, no
pet. h.).
61. See id. at *3.
62. See id. at *5.
63. 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999).
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proof that Dallas County was the proper venue and had requested a
transfer of venue to such county. Under those circumstances, the court
held that the trial court had no discretion to transfer venue except to
Dallas County, even if venue would have originally been proper in the
county of the plaintiffs' residences. 64
Two cases considered issues related to forum non-conveniens. In
Owens Corning v. Carter,65 the supreme court addressed various constitu-
tional issues related to § 71.051 of the Texas Civil Practice Code, which
sets forth the law of Texas as to forum non-conveniens in all personal
injury or death actions. 66 Although this statute allows a court to dismiss a
foreign plaintiff's claim under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, it
provides that a court may not stay or dismiss a plaintiff's claim if the
plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas. The supreme court held that this
section did not violate the Privilege and Immunities Clause of article 4 of
the United States Constitution. As a basis for this ruling, the court
opined that the statute did not discriminate on the basis of citizenship,
but rather solely on the basis of residence.67
In Baker v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,68 a wrongful death action was
filed against a helicopter manufacturer and others arising from a crash of
a helicopter off the coast of Australia. The court of appeals held that the
trial court acted properly in dismissing the case based on the forum non-
conveniens statute. 69 Although the defendant manufacturer had its prin-
cipal place of business in Texas, the court emphasized that the crash had
occurred in Australia, the plaintiffs were residents of Australia or Scot-
land, the helicopter was owned and operated by Australian entities, the
crash was investigated by Australian entities, and virtually all fact wit-
nesses were located in Australia. Under those circumstances, the court
concluded that the interests of justice would best be served by having the
case tried in Australia.70 The court also recognized that although there
ordinarily is a strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum,
this presumption applies with less force when the plaintiffs, as here, were
from foreign countries. 71
Two cases considered procedural issues related to venue. In General
Motors Corp. v. Castaneda,72 defendant's venue motion was reset for
hearing several times and was not finally heard until 20 months after the
suit had been filed and just before trial. Plaintiff contended that defen-
dant had waived any challenge to venue by filing certain discovery mo-
tions and motions for continuance without making them subject to their
64. See id. at 197-98.
65. 997 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1999).
66. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
67. Owens Corning, 997 S.W.2d at 569-70.
68. 985 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 278.
71. See id.
72. 980 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
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motion for transfer of venue. Based on the evidence, however, the court
concluded that the parties understood these pretrial motions were subject
to the pending venue motion.73 Further, as the dissent noted, discovery is
expressly authorized under the discovery rules prior to a venue hearing.
Therefore, neither discovery nor seeking protection from discovery
waives a transfer motion. 74 Additionally, the requests for continuance
were not inconsistent with the venue objection because the continuances
were necessary to allow for a venue hearing prior to trial.75
In Pines of Westbury, Ltd. v. Paul Michael Construction, Inc.,76 plaintiff
sued three defendants. In response to a venue challenge, plaintiff
claimed that venue was proper under section 15.061 of the Texas venue
statute 77 which generally provided that if venue is established as to one
defendant, then venue of an action exists over all properly joined defend-
ants. Because one of the defendants was not a resident of Texas, the trial
court agreed that venue was proper in the county of suit where the plain-
tiff resided. Subsequently, the lower court granted summary judgment in
favor of the nonresident defendant and thereafter proceeded to trial
against the remaining defendants. On appeal, the court held that once
summary judgment was granted in favor of the nonresident defendant,
the trial court no longer had venue over the remaining defendants.78
Hence, the trial court erred in proceeding with the trial and instead
should have transferred the case.
V. PARTIES
Class actions were a hot topic during the Survey period. In In re Alford
Chevrolet-Geo,79 the supreme court addressed the scope of discovery that
should be allowed prior to a ruling on class certification. In this class
action, plaintiffs claimed that numerous motor vehicle dealerships had
passed on their inventory taxes to consumers as an itemized charge in
addition to the advertised or negotiated purchase price of the vehicles.
Plaintiffs submitted written discovery that sought a broad range of infor-
mation, including, among other things, every oral and written communi-
cation with purchasers and a variety of other persons regarding the
vehicle inventory tax. Defendants objected and sought an order bifur-
cating discovery as to class certification and the merits, which the trial
court denied. Although it acknowledged that courts often limit discovery
pending class determination, the supreme court recognized that litigants
generally need some discovery to effectively support or oppose a class
certification motion.80 In many cases, discovery is needed to establish the
73. See id.
74. See id. at 785 (Butts, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 786.
76. 993 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.).
77. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.061 (Vernon 1995) (repealed).
78. See Pines of Westbury, 993 S.W.2d at 291.
79. 997 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1998).
80. See id. at 182.
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commonality of issues or typicality of claims, and such discovery is fre-
quently enmeshed with the merits.81 Accordingly, the court held that it is
within the trial court's discretion to schedule discovery and decide
whether and how much discovery is warranted to determine any class
certification questions. In short, the propriety of bifurcating class and
merits discovery depends on analysis of the separability of class certifica-
tion and merits issues in each case. Here, the court found that the de-
fendants failed to demonstrate that the certification and merits issues
were clearly separable. 82 As an example, the court observed that discov-
ery about representations made to purchasers were not only relevant to
the merits but the class issues as well. Class wide discovery on this sub-
ject would reveal whether there were variations in the representations to
the class members, which would weigh against certification. On the other
hand, class wide discovery could also uncover a common thread of deceit
running through the dealerships' various representations, which would
weigh in favor of class certification.
The court also warned against the use of nonspecific bifurcation orders.
As a practical matter, the court noted that such orders would likely pre-
cipitate numerous disputes about whether a particular interrogatory or
document request pertained to certification or the merits and could un-
reasonably interfere with the discovery of facts essential to the class de-
termination. 83 Rather, the court encouraged the use of specific discovery
orders that directly addressed the amount and nature of discovery needed
for class certification. Finally, the court rejected defendants' contention
that the discovery in question was unduly burdensome because defend-
ants had failed to produce any evidence supporting this claim and, in-
stead, had only argued in general terms that merits discovery should be
abated until a decision on class certification.84
The courts of appeals also discussed the propriety of class actions in a
variety of cases. In Entex v. City of Pearland,85 a city brought a class
action on behalf of 211 municipalities against a natural gas distributor and
its corporate parent, seeking a judgment regarding the meaning of "gross
receipts" in a franchise agreement entered into between the distributor
and the municipalities served by such distributor. Pursuant to the agree-
ment, the distributor paid a percentage of gross receipts to the municipal-
ities in return for the use of right-of-ways to distribute its natural gas to
its customers. The principal issue on appeal was whether the suit in-
fringed on the sovereignty of municipal class members to perform non-
delegable governmental functions provided by the Texas constitution and,
hence, made class certification inappropriate. More specifically, defen-
dant contended that the class representative was seeking to control and




84. See id. at 184.
85. 990 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
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tor as well as its own ordinance. Recognizing that a municipality cannot
delegate its authority to another municipality to grant a franchise, regu-
late a utility's practices, or to fix a utility's rates, the appellate court nev-
ertheless held that the governing body of a municipality may choose the
procedure by which it litigates issues involving municipal ordinances, in-
cluding through participation in a class action suit. The court emphasized
that each municipal class member would be afforded the opportunity to
opt out of the class action suit and, in making that decision, should review
the pleadings and issues involved in the suit in light of its municipal char-
ter, its own franchise ordinance, other pertinent laws, and the economic
and political impact of a judgment favorable to the class. Further, each
municipal class member would also have the opportunity to monitor the
litigation and settlement of the suit, and to utilize various procedures,
such as appearing in the suit, to protect its interests.86 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in certify-
ing the class of municipalities. 87
In HiLo Auto Supply, L.P. v. Beresky,88 the court certified a multi-state
class action brought on behalf of a class of purchasers of batteries from an
auto parts supplier. The principal claim was that the auto supplier had
sold "old" and "used" automotive batteries as "new batteries." Af-
firming the trial court's class certification decision, the appellate court
emphasized that the issue of whether the auto parts supplier offered old
or used batteries for sale as new throughout its chain of stores was a sin-
gle unifying issue common to the entire class. 89 As to potential variances
among state laws, the court of appeals noted that the trial court had not
made a choice-of-law decision as part of the certification order and could
modify the class should issues about variances in state law later develop.
As to defendant's argument that the resolution of the class members'
claims would give rise to a multitude of individual fact issues, the court
observed that such individual issues could be resolved through the filing
of individual proofs of claim and that class action treatment would avoid
repeated litigation of the common issues in individual actions.
In Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. Bate,90 certain royalty owners brought a
class action against a lessee for breach of its oil and gas leases and its
implied duty to market gas under such leases. In this case, the leases
between the class members and the defendant contained identical lan-
guage, and each class member's gas was sold by the lessee under the
terms of a single purchase contract. Accordingly, the court of appeals
held that common issues regarding the merits of the claim would
predominate over any individual issues and, hence, class action treatment
was appropriate. 91 The court also observed that a class action was a supe-
86. See id. at 912.
87. See id. at 904.
88. 986 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.).
89. See id. at 387-88.




rior method for adjudicating claims in this case because the class mem-
bers had an interest in recovering underpaid gas royalties, the class action
mechanism allowed for an efficient means to resolve disputes involving
individual claims too small to justify the expense of litigation, class coun-
sel had already conducted extensive discovery that would benefit all class
members, and the trial court had familiarized itself with voluminous
amounts of discovery previously produced in the case. 92
In Rainbow Group, Ltd. v. Johnson,93 four hair stylists, representing
other former and current hair stylists employed by a hair salon chain,
brought an action against the chain for breach of oral employment con-
tracts and violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Affirming the trial
court's decision certifying the proposed class, the court of appeals initially
determined that the numerosity requirement had been satisfied, even
though 87 of the 400 class members signed an affidavit indicating that
they were opting out of the lawsuit. In this regard, the court pointed out
that the chain employed the remaining hair stylists in 12 stores spread
geographically throughout the state and, thus, joinder of remaining mem-
bers of the class was still impracticable. The court then found numerous
common issues that warranted class action treatment, including whether
the hair salon chain had a policy of holding hair stylists "off the clock" or
of refusing to pay them for mandatory meetings, whether such policy vio-
lated their contracts, and whether the employment contracts were modi-
fied by the employees' acceptance of paychecks from the hair salon.
Although the claims in the suit were based on breach of individual, oral
employment agreements, class action treatment was still appropriate be-
cause the chain maintained one employee manual, one employee orienta-
tion form, and one set of employee policies for use in all of its stores.94
In contrast to the foregoing decision, the court of appeals in Spera v.
Fleming, Hovenkamp & Graceson, P.C 95 affirmed the denial of a motion
for the class certification. In this action, the proposed class consisted of
several thousand former clients of a law firm that had represented the
class members in a prior suit regarding defective pipe materials, which
had eventually been settled. In the present case, the plaintiffs claimed,
among other things, that the law firm had committed negligence, made
misrepresentations, and breached its fiduciary duties owed to the class.
Although the plaintiffs asserted that the factual and legal bases of their
claims against the law firm were common to all class members, the court
of appeals disagreed and, in this connection, pointed to the testimony of
the plaintiffs' own class action expert who had testified that there were, at
least, three subgroups within the class: (1) former clients who had re-
ceived nothing from the earlier litigation; (2) former clients who had set-
tled their interests in the earlier litigation and had settled their dispute
92. See id. at 743.
93. 990 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
94. Id. at 357-58.
95. 4 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
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over attorneys' fees with the law firm; and (3) former clients who had
settled their interest in the earlier litigation but had not settled their dis-
pute over attorneys' fees. Further, according to the court, even if the
duties were the same as to each of these three subgroups, whether the
duties were breached and whether the injuries were proximately caused
by any breach would differ between these three subgroups. 96 Although
the plaintiffs placed much emphasis on "dear client" letters sent to all of
the former clients regarding their claims and the settlement, the appellate
court noted that multiple individual issues still existed, such as determin-
ing which potential class members relied on any negligent or intentional
misrepresentation in the letters, who among the class members suffered
mental anguish type harm, and what duty or duties were variously owed
to the different class members. Accordingly, the appellate court con-
cluded that it was within the trial court's discretion to refuse
certification.97
In Gillespie v. Scherr,98 the court also addressed issues related to the
duties, if any, owed by class counsel to members of an uncertified class.
In this action, the defendant law firm had previously filed a class action
on behalf of all chiropractors in Texas against certain insurance compa-
nies. The class, however, was never certified and a settlement was even-
tually entered into and approved for some, but not all, of the named
plaintiffs. Subsequently, certain members of the proposed class, who
were not named plaintiffs, asserted claims against class counsel. The
court of appeals held, however, that the attorneys' act of filing a class
action suit did not, absent certification, establish an implied attorney-cli-
ent relationship with those chiropractors who were not named as plain-
tiffs in the prior lawsuit. 99 Thus, attorneys for the named plaintiffs in the
class action suit owed no pre-certification duty to potential class members
that could be a basis for a claim of malpractice. 100
Finally, two cases addressed certain procedural issues related to class
actions. In Elm Creek Owners Association v. H.O.K. Investments, Inc.,0 1
plaintiff sought to quiet its title to certain land within a subdivision and,
as a part of its action, moved to certify a mandatory class of defendants
who were current and former owners of property in such subdivision.
Prior to notice being sent to the proposed class about the action, the trial
court certified the mandatory class. The court of appeals held that due
process did not require pre-certification notice to the mandatory class
members and that any interest protected by due process arose only when
the class was certified at which point the rules of civil procedure required
96. See id. at 811.
97. See id. at 812.
98. 987 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
99. See id. at 132.
100. See id. at 131-32.




only post-certification notice. 10 2 In Christian v. ICG Telecom Canada,
Inc.,10 3 the court of appeals held that shareholders of the corporation
were not required to seek certification of a class of similarly-situated
shareholders in order to maintain a shareholder derivative suit. In this
regard, the court determined that the Texas legislature intended to estab-
lish a separate procedural system governing shareholder derivative ac-
tions brought under the Business Corporation Act, rather than requiring
compliance with all the procedures for class actions under the Rules of
Civil Procedure. 10 4
VI. PLEADINGS
During the Survey period, the courts considered a variety of issues re-
lated to pleadings. In Jenkins v. Jenkins,10 5 a former husband claimed
that his ex-wife's bankruptcy trustee had no legal right to sue him for
alimony payments that were not part of her bankruptcy estate. Applying
Rule 93,106 the court of appeals held that the former husband's conten-
tion was waived because he did not file a verified plea challenging the
capacity of the bankruptcy trustee to bring suit.10 7 In this connection, the
court distinguished between a challenge to the capacity of a party to bring
suit and a challenge based on a lack of standing. According to the court,
when a defendant challenges a plaintiff's legal right to bring suit, it is a
challenge to capacity and must be supported by a verified pleading. 10 8 In
contrast, the issue of standing concerns whether the plaintiff was person-
ally aggrieved and therefore has a justiciable interest in the controversy.
Here, the former husband was arguing that the trustee had no legal right,
i.e., no capacity, to sue him for property that was not part of the bank-
ruptcy estate and, hence, such challenge had to be supported by a verified
pleading.
In In re Sondley,10 9 the court held that the party was not entitled to
have his pro se pleadings considered by the trial court when he was also
represented by counsel in the proceeding. In short, a party is entitled to
represent himself or to be represented by an attorney, but he is not enti-
tled to representation partly by counsel and partly pro se.' 10 In D'Tel
Communications v. Roadway Package Services, Inc., 1' the court consid-
ered whether a party may add a counterclaim on appeal to the county
court from the justice court. The court of appeals ruled that a party may
not plead any counterclaim in an appeal to the county court that it did
102. See id. at *3. See TEX. R. Ov. P. 42(c)(2).
103. 996 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
104. See id. at 274-75.
105. 991 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
106. TEX. R. Ov. P. 93(2).
107. See id. at 444.
108. Jenkins, 99t S.W.2d at 443.
109. 990 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, orig. proceeding).
110. See id. at 362.
111. 987 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.).
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not plead in the justice court, irrespective of whether the counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive. 112 The court noted, however, that the appro-
priate remedy for misjoinder of the counterclaim was not dismissal, but
severance of the counterclaim. 1 3
Finally, in Whole Foods Market Southwest L.P. v. Tijerina,114 the court
discussed the circumstances under which a trial amendment may be al-
lowed after a jury's verdict. In this case, a former employee injured on
the job sued her employer for negligence and retaliatory discharge. Al-
though her petition at the time of trial requested, among other things,
punitive damages as a result of defendant's alleged wrongful and/or retal-
iatory discharge, it did not expressly plead malicious termination in sup-
port of the request for punitive damages. After a favorable jury verdict,
which included an award for punitive damages, the plaintiff moved to file
a trial amendment so as to expressly plead malicious termination, which
the trial court granted. Concluding that the trial court's ruling was not
erroneous, the court of appeals noted that defendant had failed to meet
its burden of establishing that the post-verdict trial amendment
prejudiced its case.115 First, defendant had not shown that it could not
have anticipated that plaintiff would request punitive damages for retalia-
tory discharge, particularly as the issue had been raised in her proposed
jury questions, both parties had addressed malicious termination in their
opening statements, and defendant had objected to the submission to the
jury of questions regarding malicious termination on the basis of suffi-
ciency of the evidence. Second, defendant did not establish that the claim
for malicious termination changed the nature of the trial as it had not
shown that it would have tried its case any differently from the way it did
nor had it set forth what additional evidence, if any, it would have
presented to rebut the claim of malicious termination.11 6
VII. DISCOVERY
The new Texas discovery rules, which were discussed at some length in
last year's article, 17 have thus far been the subject of only limited judicial
interpretation by the appellate courts. The supreme court and intermedi-
ate appellate courts did, however, address a number of other important
discovery issues during the Survey period. For example, as discussed
supra, In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo"1 8 involved the question of whether the
defendants in a class action were entitled to an order bifurcating class and
merits discovery. 1 9 The supreme court held that, because the defendants
112. See id. at 214.
113. See id.
114. 979 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
115. See id. at 777.
116. See id.
117. See A. Erin Dwyer, et al., Texas Civil Procedure, 52 SMU L. REV. 1485, 1496-1502
(1999) [hereinafter 1999 Annual Survey].
118. 997 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1999).
119. See id. at 175.
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"did not clearly distinguish class and merits discovery, [they were] not
entitled to an order bifurcating the two.' 120 In-doing so, the court recog-
nized that discovery, particularly in class actions, can be used as "'a
weapon capable of imposing large and unjustifiable costs on one's adver-
sary." 21 But, said the court, whether class and merits discovery are
clearly separable must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 122 Because
the defendants had failed to explain how the two should be separated,
and the supreme court in fact concluded they were likely to be inter-
twined, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to enter a
bifurcation order. 123 Moreover, the court pointed out that a non-specific
order bifurcating class and merits discovery would merely beg the ques-
tion of which side of the line particular discovery requests fell on and
would serve no useful purpose. 124
In In re Continental General Tire, Inc.,125 the supreme court addressed
for the first time the trade secret privilege codified in 1983 in the Texas
Rules of Evidence. 126 Rule 507127 provides that a party has a privilege
against disclosure of trade secrets "if the allowance of the privilege will
not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice."' 28 The supreme
court interpreted this rule to mean that, once a party has established that
the requested information is a trade secret, "the burden shifts to the re-
questing party to establish that the information is necessary for a fair ad-
judication of its claim or defense." 29 Relevance alone is insufficient to
meet this standard. 130 The trial judge must balance, on the facts of each
particular case, the extent to which the information is needed by the re-
questing party against the potential harm to the resisting party from dis-
closure.t31 If trade secret information is ordered produced, the trial court
should ordinarily make it subject to an appropriate protective order.' 32
120. Id. at 175-76.
121. Id. at 180 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69
B.U.L. Rev. 635, 636 (1989)).
122. See Alford, 997 S.W.2d at 182.
123. See id. at 182-83. In a vigorous and lengthy dissent, Justice Hecht argued that the
majority was placing the entire burden of coming forward with a "specific, detailed pre-
certification discovery plan" on the defendants, "without requiring the plaintiffs to show
how much discovery is justified." Id. at 185-86 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 183.
125. 979 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1998).
126. See id. at 610-11.
127. TEX. R. Evin. 507.
128. Id.
129. Continental General, 979 S.W.2d at 610.
130. Id. at 613-14. See also In re Frost, 998 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999,
orig. proceeding) (requesting party's argument of why customer of list was relevant, with-
out evidence that it was necessary for fair adjudication of claim, was insufficient to over-
come trade secret privilege).
131. Continental General, 979 S.W.2d at 612-13.
132. See id. at 613 & n.3. The supreme court rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion that in
actions between parties that are not business competitors, disclosure of relevant trade se-
cret information should always be compelled, subject to an appropriate protective order.
See id. at 613. Conversely, the court also rejected the defendant's argument that the trade
secret privilege should be absolute because of the risk that any protective order might be
violated or that the trade secret information might later be found to be a "court record"
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The supreme court also struck down, on First Amendment grounds, 33
a discovery order compelling the disclosure of a nonprofit corporation's
contributor list.134 The court concluded that the corporation had made
the required prima facie showing that the trial court's order impermissi-
bly burdened their First Amendment associational rights by offering
"non-speculative evidence of economic and political reprisals against it-
self and its contributors."1 35 Because the taxpayer plaintiffs failed to
show that the identity of the contributors was substantially related to a
compelling government interest, therefore, the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in ordering disclosure of that information. 136
Under the new procedural rules that went into effect in Texas on Janu-
ary 1, 1999, witness statements are now specifically discoverable. 137 The
court in In re W&G Trucking, Inc.138 held that this new rule applied to a
witness statement obtained before January 1, 1999, and that the applica-
tion of the new rule in this manner did not deprive the relator of any
substantive right.' 39 In this regard, the court noted that even under the
old discovery rules, the relator was not assured that the witness statement
would have been protected, as the trial court could have ordered it pro-
duced upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship.' 40
Finally, two cases decided during the Survey period addressed attempts
to block requested discovery based on non-privilege confidentiality con-
cerns. In the first, In re Continental Insurance Co.,141 the court held that
parties "cannot protect relevant information from discovery by confiden-
tiality provisions in contracts, even settlement agreements.' 42 Moreo-
ver, the court warned that an agreed confidentiality provision cannot
require a party to assert frivolous objections to producing discoverable
information, and that parties "abuse the discovery process if the only rea-
son they resist discovery is because they have agreed not to surrender the
information without a court order."' 43 In In re Doctors Hospital of
Laredo, L.P.,144 the court relied on a 1970 Texas Supreme Court case in
holding that "income tax schedules and calendars of nonparty witnesses
are not discoverable to show bias."'1 45 The court rejected the argument
that is subject to disclosure under TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a. See Continental General, 979
S.W.2d at 614.
133. U.S. CoNsT. amend I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging ... the right of
the people peaceably to assemble").
134. See In re Bay Area Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, 982 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex.
1998).
135. Id. at 376-77.
136. Id. at 378-79.
137. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(h).
138. 990 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, orig. proceeding).
139. See id. at 475.
140. See id.
141. 994 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, orig. proceeding).
142. Id. at 425.
143. Id. at 426.
144. 2 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding).
145. Id. at *2 (citing Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970)).
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that new Rule 192.3(e)(5), 146 which now specifically permits discovery
into the bias of any testifying expert, was intended to overrule the prece-
dent protecting a nonparty's personal financial records.
VIII. DISMISSAL
In Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equipment,147 the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of an action for want of prosecu-
tion, criticizing the wording of the Bexar County District Clerk's dismis-
sal notice for failing to properly notify litigants of the local trial court's
requirements to avoid a dismissal. In this case, the trial court issued a
notice setting the case for dismissal. The plaintiff's counsel, after filing
proper motions to retain the case and set it on the jury docket, timely
appeared and announced ready for trial at the dismissal hearing. The
trial court nonetheless dismissed the case, which decision the appellate
court affirmed. The supreme court reversed and reinstated the case, ini-
tially holding that the actions of the plaintiff's counsel deprived the trial
court of authority under Rule 165a(1) 148 to dismiss the case. The court
then examined whether the trial court's inherent authority permitted the
dismissal of the action. A prerequisite to the exercise of such inherent
authority is adequate notice to the parties of the trial court's intent to
exercise it, however, and the court concluded that the clerk's notice failed
to state that the case would be dismissed absent a showing of good cause.
Since the plaintiff's counsel appeared and announced ready as instructed,
the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case under its inher-
ent authority. The court disapproved of the language in several other
court of appeals' decisions interpreting the Bexar County dismissal notice
contrary to the holding in this case. 149
Addressing the effect of the plaintiffs' voluntary nonsuit of a defendant
and subsequent attempt to reinstate and sanction that defendant after en-
try of a final judgment, the court in In re Simon Property Group (Dela-
ware), Inc.150 conditionally granted a writ of mandamus, concluding that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the dismissed defendant. The
plaintiffs had nonsuited one of several defendants following receipt of an
affidavit indicating that that defendant did not own an interest in the
property at issue. More than thirty days following the entry of a judg-
ment in their favor, the plaintiffs then sought to reinstate their claims
against (and sanction) the dismissed defendant based on evidence ad-
duced at trial. The court of appeals first noted that the only provision in
146. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e)(5).
147. 994 S.W.2d. 628 (Tex. 1999).
148. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(1).
149. See Ozuna v. Southwest Bio-Clinical Lab., 766 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1989, writ denied); Knight v. Trent, 739 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1987, no writ); Gaebler v. Harris, 625 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Laird v. Jobes, 580 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ).
150. 985 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding).
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the procedural rules for a motion to reinstate is Rule 165a(3), 151 which
provides that such motion must be filed within thirty days of the order
dismissing the case for want of prosecution. Because reinstatement of a
nonsuited defendant did not fall squarely within this rule, the court analo-
gized this situation to a motion for new trial and concluded that a motion
to reinstate filed more than thirty days after the entry of the final judg-
ment was untimely. The court then concluded that because the trial
court's jurisdiction over the nonsuited defendant had expired, it also
lacked the authority to sanction that defendant.
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Two appellate courts handed down conflicting opinions during the Sur-
vey period regarding the requirements to preserve error over objections
to summary judgment evidence, following changes to Rule 33.1 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 152 The Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals, in Frazier v. Yu,1 53 held that the objecting party did not need a
written order sustaining evidentiary objections to preserve the point of
error on appeal. In this auto accident dispute, the defendant moved for
summary judgment under Rule 166a(i), 154 arguing that there was no evi-
dence that the accident proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. The
plaintiff filed a response and supporting affidavits, to which the defendant
then filed written objections. The trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, indicating on the docket sheet that "plaintiff
nor attorney submitted any summary judgment evidence nor did she ap-
pear." After the hearing, but before the entry of judgment, the plaintiff
moved for leave to amend the challenged affidavits; however, the trial
court never expressly ruled on that motion.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued first that the above-quoted docket nota-
tion evidenced the trial court's failure to consider the plaintiff's proffered
affidavits. Second, the plaintiff contended that the defendant had failed
to preserve his evidentiary objections by not obtaining written rulings
thereon. The appellate court disagreed, noting that the adoption of Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1,155 effective September 1, 1997, relaxed
the former requirement that a party objecting to summary judgment evi-
dence obtain an express, written ruling on such objections. 156 Thus, the
court held that "error is preserved as long as the record indicates in some
way that the trial court ruled on the objection either expressly or implic-
itly."1 57 Here, the appellate court reasoned, the trial court was clearly
aware of the evidentiary objections, as they were in writing, and implicitly
151. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(3).
152. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1.
153. 987 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
154. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
155. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1.
156. See, e.g., Camden Mach. & Tool v. Cascade Co., 870 S.W.2d 304, 310 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1993, no writ),
157. Frazier, 987 S.W.2d at 610.
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sustained those objections, as evidenced by the language in its order
granting the dispositive motion, which stated that the trial court had "re-
viewed all competent summary judgment evidence. '158 Because the
plaintiff failed to challenge either the evidentiary ruling on appeal or to
assign error to the trial court's failure to allow her leave to amend her
allegedly deficient affidavits, the summary judgment was affirmed.
In Harris v. The Spires Council of Co-Owners,159 on the other hand, a
Houston appellate court ruled that the summary judgment movant failed
to preserve error by not obtaining a written ruling on a form evidentiary.
Specifically, while the movant had filed written objections to an affidavit
as containing hearsay, supposition, and assumption, he failed to obtain a
written ruling on those objections. The majority held that such failure
constituted a waiver of the objections on appeal and, therefore, reversed
the summary judgment decision in part. Until the Texas Supreme Court
resolves the conflict between these cases, the careful practitioner may still
wish to continue to seek written rulings on objections to summary judg-
ment evidence.
In Upchurch V. Albear,160 a dispute between attorneys and their clients
related to the settlement of toxic tort cases, the attorneys filed a summary
judgment motion that was accompanied by a voluminous record, which
they did not index, reference, or cite in their summary judgment materi-
als. The clients objected to this failure to properly cite the summary judg-
ment evidence, but the trial court elected not to address the record at all
and instead issued its ruling based solely on the law. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the clients' objections to this evidence were well-
founded and that they were entitled to fair notice of the movants' conten-
tions. Moreover, the court reasoned that although the trial court has a
duty to determine whether material fact questions exist, the parties must
still specifically cite to the evidence on which they rely.
Several appellate courts addressed the rare intersection between sum-
mary judgment and mandamus practice during the survey period. The
court in In re Mission Consolidated Independent School Districtl61 condi-
tionally granted a writ of mandamus after the trial court failed to rule on
a "no evidence" summary judgment motion, which the non-movant had
failed to even respond to after eight months. The court noted that man-
damus is not available either to challenge the denial of a summary judg-
ment motion or to force a trial court to grant a no evidence motion.
However, where the trial court refuses even to rule on such a motion in a
reasonable time, mandamus is appropriate in light of the clear language
of Rule 166a(i)162-i.e., that the court must grant the motion unless the
158. Id. (emphasis original).
159. 981 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
160. 5 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet. h.).
161. 990 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding).
162. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
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respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue
of material fact.
In In re Mohawk Rubber Co.,16 3 also a mandamus proceeding, the
court held that ten years is "more than 'adequate time for discovery."' In
this mass tort action, the defendant had moved for summary judgment
under Rule 166a(i),164 arguing that there was no evidence linking its
products to the injuries claimed by some two hundred plaintiffs. The trial
court denied the summary judgment motion (without prejudice), ac-
knowledging the lack of evidence proving causation, but also noting that
a case management scheduling order had since been issued, and that ad-
ditional discovery might lead to the discovery of evidence proving causa-
tion. In response to the petition for writ of mandamus, the appellate
court first noted that it lacked the authority in the context of a mandamus
proceeding to require the trial court to rescind its summary judgment or-
der. Nevertheless, it went on to explain how the trial court had improp-
erly analyzed and applied the no-evidence summary judgment rule.
Specifically, Rule 166a(i) 165 does not require that the summary judgment
motion attack the evidentiary components that may prove an element of
the opponent's cause of action; rather, the rule only requires the motion
to be specific in alleging the lack of evidentiary support for an essential
element of a claim of defense.166 Moreover, Rule 166a(i) 167 does not re-
quire that a respondent marshal all of its evidence, only that it present
some summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact
on the element attacked. Finally, the appellate court criticized the lan-
guage in the trial court's case management scheduling order that pro-
vided for more time to complete discovery, because Rule 166a(i)168 does
not require that discovery be completed, only that an "adequate" time for
discovery has passed. Here, because the case had been on file for ten
years, and the defendant's no-evidence summary judgment motion had
been on file for nearly a year before the trial court addressed it, the plain-
tiffs had been granted a sufficient opportunity to conduct adequate dis-
covery. Therefore, the court required the trial court to issue a new
scheduling order that provided dates by which the plaintiffs were re-
quired to specify the production of causation information.
The court in In re Lee169 refused to grant a petition for writ of manda-
mus from the denial of a summary judgment motion, in which the defen-
dant asserted that statements made in an attorney's letter were absolutely
privileged from a defamation claim. Although the court acknowledged
the absolute privilege related to statements in litigation, it held that the
privilege was only an affirmative defense and not an absolute bar or im-
163. 982 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, orig. proceeding).
164. TEX. R. Cv. P. 166a(i).
165. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
166. See Mohawk Rubber, 982 S.W.2d at 498.
167. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
168. Id.
169. 995 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding).
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munity from suit that warranted a mandamus relief.170
In Lampasas v. Spring Center, Inc.,171 the court addressed when a
pleading amendment may defeat a no evidence summary judgment mo-
tion. In this negligence action, the defendant moved for summary judg-
ment based in large part upon the absence of a legal duty owed to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff amended his pleadings three days before the origi-
nal hearing date on the motion, but only to assert additional negligence
theories. The trial court then reset the summary judgment hearing for
three weeks after the amended pleading was filed and, upon hearing,
granted the motion. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a party
does not necessarily defeat a Rule 166a(i) 172 motion simply by amending
its pleadings without adducing additional summary judgment evidence,
especially where the same legal theories remain at issue. 173
The subject of so-called Mother Hubbard clauses in the context of sum-
mary judgment proceedings once again challenged the appellate courts
during the Survey period. In Midkiff v. Hancock East Texas Sanitation,
Inc.,174 the plaintiff sued both his employer and the lessee of the premises
upon which he was injured. The employer moved for summary judgment,
following which the trial signed an order that granted the employer's dis-
positive motion and stated that "all relief requested and not expressly
granted is DENIED.' 75 Plaintiff appealed from this order. However,
the appellate court concluded that the mere inclusion of the above-
quoted language did not automatically render the trial court's order final,
as it did not dispose of all claims and all parties. 176 Rather than dis-
missing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, however, the court elected in-
stead under Rule 44.3177 to abate the appeal and remand the action to the
district court either to sever the claims against the employer or to enter
an order disposing of all the claims against the co-defendant. 178
The court in Harris County Flobd Control District v. Adam179 also ad-
dressed the effect of a Mother Hubbard clause in a summary judgment
proceeding. In this property dispute, 220 property owners sued some fifty
defendants, including several governmental units, two of which success-
fully moved for summary judgment. The order that granted the disposi-
tive motions of the two defendants also severed them from the original
proceeding and contained the following language: "All other relief not
specifically granted is denied."1 80 The court rejected the argument that
this language disposed not only of the severed proceeding, but also of the
170. See id. at 776.
171. 988 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
172. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
173. See Lampasas, 988 S.W.2d at 436.
174. 996 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999 no pet.).
175. Id. at 415.
176. See id. at 416.
177. TEX. R. App. P. 44.3.
178. See Midkiff, 996 S.W.2d at 416.
179. 988 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
180. Id. at 426.
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original proceeding as well. The court held that when a trial court enters
a severance order with the intent of making the severed action final and
appealable, the "Mother Hubbard clause in [such] a severance order [cre-
ates] a final and appealable judgment only as to the parties and claims in
the severed cause."'181
In Rodriguez v. NBC Bank,18 2 the court similarly held that the inclu-
sion of a Mother Hubbard clause ("All relief not expressly granted herein
is denied") in a summary judgment order, did not (and could not) purport
to grant or deny more relief than the moving party sought and, therefore,
did not dispose of all claims and all parties, particularly the claims as-
serted against a defendant that had not moved for summary judgment.
X. JURY PRACTICE
The Texas Supreme Court in Yanes v. Soward'83 held that "if the death
or serious illness of a family member renders a juror unable to discharge
his responsibilities, trial may proceed with fewer than twelve jurors." In
this medical malpractice action, a juror advised the trial court of his
grandfather's serious illness and anticipated death. As a result of its in-
quiry, the trial court then concluded that the juror was sufficiently dis-
tracted by the circumstances of his grandfather's illness that he was
"disabled" under Rule 292184 from sitting due to a mental incapacity. Al-
though counsel for both parties objected to the trial court's examination
of the juror as "overly suggestive," and thus to the court's disability find-
ing, neither counsel (perhaps wisely so) elected to question the juror.
Finding ample evidence of the juror's mental incapacity based on his
grandfather's illness, the supreme court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the juror as disabled and allowing the
case to proceed to verdict.
A Houston appellate court in In the Interest of K.R., 185 held that the
trial court did not commit reversible error by requiring the appellant,
who had been convicted of reckless injury to a child in a prior criminal
case, to appear handcuffed during the entire trial of a suit to terminate his
parental rights. Noting the absence of any Texas civil jurisprudence on
the issue, the appellate court looked to Texas criminal opinions and fed-
eral civil cases for guidance in reaching its conclusion. The court first
held that the presumption that exists in criminal cases against requiring a
party to appear before the jury wearing handcuffs should apply to civil
cases. 186 The court then analyzed whether the trial court's error in keep-
ing the appellant shackled during the trial was sufficiently prejudicial that
it was calculated to, and probably did, cause the rendition of an improper
181. Id. at 427 (emphasis original).
182. 5 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.).
183. 996 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 1999).
184. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
185. No. 14-98-00118-CV; 1999 WL 672525 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 31,
1999, no pet. h.).
186. See id. at *24.
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judgment. Here, although the trial court failed to specify its justification
for keeping the appellant handcuffed throughout the proceedings, the ap-
pellate court held that such error was harmless because the jury was per-
mitted to hear extensive evidence about the acts that formed the grounds
of the appellant's criminal conviction. 187 The trial court also instructed
the jury to infer nothing relating to the issue of termination of parental
rights from the appellant's handcuffs, other than that he was incarcerated
for the offense. The court concluded, however, by limiting its holding to
the facts of the case.
XI. JURY CHARGE
The Texas Supreme Court issued two opinions of note regarding jury
charges during the Survey period. In Crown Life Insurance Company v.
Casteel,'88 an action by an insured against an agent and an insurer over a
vanishing premium life insurance policy, the jury received a single broad-
form question on the issue of the insurer's liability to the agent (who
claimed to have been injured in selling the policy) based on thirteen inde-
pendent grounds of liability, including several under the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA"). 189 The supreme
court first held that the agent had standing to sue the insurer under Arti-
cle 21.21190 for unfair and deceptive practices, but lacked standing to as-
sert claims under the DTPA.191 In light of this ruling, the court went on
to hold that the trial court committed harmful error in submitting invalid
theories of liability to the jury in a single broad-form jury question where
it could not be determined whether the jury based its verdict on one or
more of the invalid theories. Because the court was unable to conclude
that the jury's liability answer was not based on an improper theory, a
reversal was required. 192
In Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Fund v. Mandlbauer,93 the
supreme court held that a plaintiff lacked standing to complain on appeal
regarding the trial court's refusal to submit an inferential rebuttal jury
instruction, which refusal was only harmful to the defendant. Because
inferential rebuttals are defensive theories, the court concluded that the
trial court's failure to submit such an instruction could only have harmed
the defendant.
XII. JUDGMENTS
The preclusive effect of a prior judgment was the subject of two Texas
Supreme Court cases during the Survey period. In the first, Ingersoll-
187. See id.
188. 43 TEX. SuP. Cr. J. 348, 2000 WL 72142 (Jan. 27, 2000).
189. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41, et seq.
190. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. ART. 21.21 § 16.a.
191. Casteel, 43 TEX. Sup. C. J. at 352.
192. Id. at 354-55.
193. 988 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1999).
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Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp.,1 94 the court reaffirmed that a contrac-
tual indemnity claim does not accrue until the indemnitee's liability be-
comes fixed and certain.195 Thus, the court held that the indemnity claim
at issue was not a compulsory counterclaim and was not barred by res
judicata based on the failure of the defendant to assert it as a counter-
claim in a prior case. 196 The court distinguished its prior decision in Getty
Oil v. Insurance Co. of North America,' 97 in which it had concluded that
the indemnitee's claim was barred by res judicata, because in Getty the
indemnitee had already sought the same relief by cross-claim in the ear-
lier action. 19 8
The high court's second opinion, Quinney Electric, Inc. v. Kondos En-
tertainment, Inc.,199 involved the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion. The defendants in that case invoked collateral estoppel as a
defense to a breach of contract claim, arguing that the plaintiff had pre..
vailed on the same contract against a third party in bankruptcy court.200
Surprisingly, the court of appeals agreed that the plaintiff's claim was pre-
cluded. 201 The supreme court reversed, noting "the court of appeals mis-
understood the basic function of collateral estoppel-to prevent a party
from relitigating an issue that the party previously litigated and lost. ''20 2
Because the plaintiff had won in bankruptcy court, it was not precluded
from relitigating its claim against different parties in state court.203
The supreme court addressed the proof required to support a default
judgment in Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. v. New.20 4 The court held that
hearsay affidavits admitted, without objection, at a default judgment
hearing are legally sufficient to support a default judgment on both dam-
ages and attorney's fees. 20 5 Of course, as the court noted, the defendant's
failure to answer results in the liability allegations of the petition being
deemed admitted. 20 6
The supreme court also discussed the proper interpretation of the stat-
ute governing settlement credits in Drilex Systems, Inc. v. Flores.20 7 The
plaintiffs in that case were an injured worker and his wife and three chil-
dren.20 8 Prior to trial, the plaintiffs settled with one of the defendants
194. 997 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1999).
195. See id. at 207.
196. See id. at 207-09. The court noted that the case before it raised an anomalous
situation in which the indemnitor was also the plaintiff seeking damages from the indemni-
tee; the more common situation is for the indemnitee, having been sued by a third party, to
look to the indemnitor either by a third-party claim or a separate suit. Id. at 208.
197. 845 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 820 (1993).
198. See Valero Energy, 997 S.W.2d at 209 (citing Getty, 845 S.W.2d at 630).
199. 988 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999).
200. See id. at 213.
201. See id.
202. Id. (emphasis original).
203. See id.
204. 3 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 1999).
205. See id. at 516.
206. See id. at 515.
207. 1 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 1999).
208. See id. at 115.
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and entered into an agreed judgment that specified how the settlement
payment would be allocated among each of the plaintiffs.20 9 Based on
the plain language of the governing statute,210 the supreme court held
that, regardless of the agreed-upon allocation, all of the plaintiffs had to
be treated as one "claimant," and the total damages recovered by all of
them against the non-settling defendants had to be reduced by the total
amount of the prior settlement.211 After this reduction, in order to give
effect to the jury's verdict, the remaining damages should then be allo-
cated to the individual plaintiffs based on their respective percentages of
the jury's total damage award. 212 Although the court acknowledged that
this methodology might cause some plaintiffs to recover more than the
jury awarded, and might cause others to have their awards reduced by
settlement payments made to their co-plaintiffs, such a result was man-
dated by the statutory language. 213 Moreover, said the court, the statu-
tory method protects non-settling defendants from manipulation of the
settlement allocation by the plaintiffs, who will often be family members
with a common interest.214
The court of appeals in Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd.215 followed what it
called the majority rule in Texas in holding that a suit for declaratory
judgment is not available to obtain a judicial interpretation of a prior
judgment.2 16 The court reasoned that a contrary decision would effec-
tively permit a new method of review of judgments and would constitute
an impermissible collateral attack on the prior judgment.217
Finally, the oft-misunderstood judgment nunc pro tunc was the subject
of decisions by both Houston courts of appeals in In re Rollins Leasing,
Inc.2 18 and Amato v. Hernandez.21 9 In both cases, the appellate courts
rejected the trial court's entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc.220 In Rollins
Leasing, the trial court purported to correct a "clerical error" in the prior
judgment that dismissed the entire case, rather than just one defendant,
pursuant to a settlement.221 Even though the real parties in interest ar-
gued that the settlement agreement and motion to dismiss clearly con-
templated only the dismissal of one defendant, the court of appeals held
that this did not show that only a clerical error, as opposed to a judicial
209. See id.
210. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.012(b)(1) (Vernon 1997).
211. See Flores, 42 TEX. Sup. Cr. J. at 1126-27.
212. See id. at 1127.
213. See id. at 1128.
214. See id.
215. 2 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
216. See id. at 353.
217. See id. The court also noted that the proper procedure for challenging such a
claim is not a plea in abatement but a plea in bar, such as a summary judgment motion.
See id. at 354.
218. 987 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding).
219. 981 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).
220. See Rollins Leasing, 987 S.W.2d at 636-37; Amato, 981 S.W.2d at 949-50.
221. See Rollins Leasing, 987 S.W.2d at 635.
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error, had been made.222 A clerical error, for purposes of nunc pro tunc,
is when the written judgment does not accurately reflect the judgment
actually rendered by the court.223 Because the only judgment rendered
by the visiting judge in that case was the one he signed, the error in the
judgment was a judicial error.22 4 Similarly, the judgment nunc pro tunc in
Amato, which added to the judgment a defendant who had not been
properly served, was not a correction of a clerical error and was, there-
fore, void.
XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Holding that the filing of an amended motion for new trial did not
extend the trial court's plenary jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court
conditionally granted a writ of mandamus in In re Dickason,225 directing
the trial court to vacate as void an untimely order granting a new trial.
Although a trial court retains plenary power for thirty days after overrul-
ing a timely motion for a new trial, the filing of an amended motion does
not further affect the appellate timetable.
The Texas Supreme Court construed the mandate of Rule 329b(c) 226
that a motion for new trial can only be granted by a "written order
signed" in In re Barber.227 The court held that an agreed order setting
aside a default judgment bearing the facsimile signature of the presiding
judge, which had been affixed by the court coordinator, met the require-
ments of this rule even in the absence of a signed original order. In the
underlying proceeding, one of the defendants timely filed and served an
answer, which plaintiff's counsel admitted receiving. Nonetheless, for
reasons not explained by the court, the plaintiff sought a default judg-
ment, which the trial court granted without realizing the defendant had
answered (apparently because the district clerk was behind on his filing).
The defendant timely moved to set aside the default judgment and for a
new trial. Before the hearing on those motions, the parties submitted an
agreed order granting a new trial, on which the court coordinator
stamped the then-presiding judge's signature. Before the judge could ac-
tually sign the original order, however, he died of a heart attack. When a
subsequent trial judge levied monetary sanctions for discovery abuse
against the plaintiff's counsel, he sought to have that sanction order de-
clared void, arguing that the trial court's plenary jurisdiction had expired
because the agreed order setting aside the default judgment had never
been properly entered.
222. See id. at 637.
223. See id. at 636.
224. See id. at 637. As the court further stated the test, "the question is not what the
trial judge 'intended' to render, but what the judge 'actually' rendered." Id. (quoting Nat'l
Unity Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 926 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, orig.
proceeding).
225. 987 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
226. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
227. 982 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1999).
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The supreme court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus based on
its review of affidavits from the court coordinator that she had affixed the
trial court's stamped signature to the agreed order at the trial judge's
direction. The court concluded that in the absence of any evidence con-
troverting that the trial court approved the agreed order and directed that
its signature be stamped on it, the court's stamped signature met the re-
quirements of Rule 329b(c). 228 The dissent argued that under Stork v.
State,229 a facsimile signature is only valid if it is affixed in the trial court's
presence, which requirement the dissent reasoned the majority had effec-
tively abandoned. Finding that the benefits of the tripartite requirements
of a facsimile signature announced in Stork (i.e., immediate authority, di-
rection, and presence) outweighed the disadvantages cited by the major-
ity opinion, the dissenters would have denied the writ of mandamus.
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The Seventy-Sixth Legislature enacted several changes affecting the
authority of judges. First, a judge who has jurisdiction over a suit pending
in one county is now authorized to conduct any of the proceedings in the
case, other than trial on the merits, in a different county unless a party
objects.2 30 Second, the legislature conformed the practice in the constitu-
tional county courts to that of the district courts by allowing the presiding
judge to appoint a visiting judge to serve whenever a county court judge
is absent, incapacitated, or disqualified. 231 Finally, the legislature added a
new provision to the civil Practice and Remedies Code governing third or
subsequent motions for recusal or disqualification in a case. 232 A sitting
judge who declines recusal after such a "tertiary recusal motion" shall
continue to preside over the case and may sign orders, although all such
orders must be vacated if the motion is ultimately granted.2 33
In re Perritt234 involved the interplay between Rule 18a's 235 procedure
for the assignment of a judge to hear a recusal motion and a party's right
to object to the assignment of a visiting judge. 236 The supreme court held
that a judge assigned by the presiding judge of the administrative judicial
district to hear a recusal motion is subject to objection and mandatory
disqualification. 237 The court reasoned that while the procedure for re-
228. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
229. 114 TEx. CRIM. 398, 23 S.W.2d 733, 735 (1930).
230. See TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 74.094(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
231. See TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 26.011 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Prior to its amend-
ment, the statute required the governor to appoint a "special judge" to sit for the disquali-
fied or absent county judge. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN., § 26.011 (Vernon 1988).
232. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. COE ANN. § 30.016 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
233. See id. The statute also provides that if the motion is denied, the movant and its
attorneys are jointly and severally liable for a mandatory award of the reasonable and
necessary attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the non-movant. Id.
234. 992 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1999).
235. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
236. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (Vernon 1998).
237. See id.; Perritt, 992 S.W.2d at 445.
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ferral of a recusal matter is described by Rule 18a,238 the presiding
judge's authority to assign the matter to another judge derives from
Chapter 74 of the Government Code, and the assigned judge is therefore
subject to a party's objection under that statute.239
In re PG&E Reata Energy, L.P.240 upheld the validity of a local admin-
istrative judge's orders transferring to himself a number of cases in which
motions to recuse the sitting judge had been filed and, in several of the
cases, had already been granted by the regional presiding judge.241 The
court noted the recusal process was separate from the process for the
transfer of cases within a particular county in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice.242 According to the court, the transfers for judi-
cial convenience did no violence to the interests protected by the rules
governing recusal, and litigants do not have a proprietary right to have
their cases heard by any particular judge-even one who was assigned by
the presiding judge after a successful motion to recuse.
XV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
The Texas Supreme Court issued several significant opinions in the at-
torney disqualification arena during the Survey period. The first, In re
Epic Holdings, Inc. ,243 examined the proper application of the discipli-
nary rule governing an attorney's representation in a matter adverse to a
former client.244 Several of the plaintiff's lawyers were formerly partners
or associates in a law firm, since dissolved, that had represented an indi-
vidual and corporate defendants in connection with the formation of the
corporation.245 Although plaintiff's claims arose out of events occurring
later in the corporation's history, the court nevertheless found they were
related to the legal work performed by the prior firm because plaintiff
alleged the corporation was created in a manner that allowed the direc-
tors to abuse their power.246 Moreover, after reviewing the strategy em-
ployed by plaintiff's counsel at trial, the court held that the attorneys
238. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.
239. See Perritt, 992 S.W.2d at 447. Interestingly, the court also held that relator was
entitled to mandamus relief when the assigned judge refused to recuse himself, even
though relator was not the party that objected to the assignment. See id. at 446.
240. See 4 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
241. See id. The same court had previously granted mandamus relief because the ad-
ministrative judge lacked authority under the local rules to unilaterally transfer cases to his
own court. See In re Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 987 S.W.2d 167, 176 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1999, pet. denied). After the local rules were amended to grant him such authority,
however, the administrative judge re-transferred the cases to himself. See PG&E Reata, 4
S.W.3d at 897.
242. See id. at 900.
243. 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998).
244. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.09, reprinted in TEX. GOVT CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9) (generally
prohibiting lawyer's representation of a client in a matter adverse to a former client if the
validity of the lawyer's service to the former client is questioned or the subject matter is the
same or is substantially related).
245. See 985 S.W.2d at 44, 48-50.
246. See id. at 50-51.
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questioned the validity of the work done by their former firm while they
were still members of it, and that the relationship between that work and
the plaintiff's claims, as the attorneys chose to prosecute them, was there-
fore substantial.2 47 Because the rule against such representation protects
the integrity of the legal process, disqualification was mandated. 248
The supreme court addressed several disqualification issues in In re
American Home Products Corp.2 4 9 The court first concluded that plain-
tiffs' counsel were not disqualified based on their retention of a testifying
expert who had previously served as a consulting expert for the defend-
ants in the same litigation.250 The court noted that the expert was also a
treating physician for some of the plaintiffs, although the defendants were
unaware of that fact when they hired him as a consultant. 25' The court
then analyzed the disqualification issue solely as a question of the discov-
erability of the consulting expert's identity, factual knowledge, and
mental impressions and opinions.252 The court concluded that even
though some communications between defendant's counsel and the ex-
pert may have been in anticipation of litigation, the expert was also sub-
ject to being called as a witness by plaintiffs since he was a treating
physician.2 53 Accordingly, the facts known to the expert, regardless of
their source, were subject to discovery, and plaintiffs' counsel were not
disqualified.2 54
Defendants fared better when the court turned to whether plaintiffs'
counsel should be disqualified by their hiring of a paralegal who had pre-
viously assisted defendants in the same litigation.25 5 Relying on its prior
decision in Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall,256 the court reiterated the
rule that a legal assistant or other nonlawyer that migrates from one side
of a case to another is conclusively presumed to have received confiden-
tial information in her former employment, although the presumption
that she has shared that information with her new employer may be re-
247. See id. at 51-52. See also In re Butler, 987 S.W.2d 221, 226-27 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (trial court could reasonably conclude that prior
representation of insurer in a case alleging breach of duty to defend and wrongful denial of
coverage was substantially related to representation of a client asserting similar claims
against insurer, even though arising from a factually unrelated incident).
248. See Epic Holdings, 985 S.W.2d at 52. The court also dispatched plaintiff's argu-
ment that the conflict of interest had been waived by the defendants' delay in raising it,
holding that it was the way plaintiff presented her case at trial, rather than anything inher-
ent in the claim, that called the law firm's services into question and required the disqualifi-
cation. See id. at 52-53.
249. 985 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. 1998).
250. See id. at 73-74.
251. See id. at 74.
252. See id. (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(2)(e)).
253. See American Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 73.
254. See id. at 73-74.
255. See id. at 74. Although the parties argued about whether the paralegal was really a
"freelance consultant" when she worked for defendants, see id., the court noted that such
distinctions were unimportant to the nature of her relationship with the defendants or the
professional obligations attendant thereto. See id. at 77,
256. 887 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1994).
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butted.257 The only rebuttal evidence offered by the paralegal's new em-
ployer in American Home Products, however, was his own testimony that
no confidential information was disclosed.2 58 The court held this was in-
sufficient to overcome the presumption in the absence of any evidence
that the new employer took precautions to screen the paralegal off from
any work on the case.2 59
After holding that the lawyer who hired the paralegal was disqualified,
the court then addressed whether his co-counsel should likewise be dis-
qualified.260 Balancing the various competing interests, the court an-
nounced several imputation rules to be applied in disqualification cases.
First, the new employer's failure to screen a "tainted" nonlawyer (i.e., one
presumed to possess confidential information of the adversary) does not
automatically result in the disqualification of co-counsel.2 61 Instead, a
court should disqualify co-counsel only if the nature of his relationship
with the nonlawyer is such that there is a "substantial likelihood" that
confidential information was shared.2 62 Once it is established that there
was contact between the nonlawyer and co-counsel, the burden is on co-
counsel to show that there was no reasonable prospect that the oppo-
nent's confidential information was disclosed and that it was not in fact
disclosed.263
The court then turned to the more difficult issue of whether co-counsel
should be disqualified because of his contact with the disqualified attor-
ney-employer, who was himself disqualified only because of the presump-
tion that the tainted nonlawyer shared the adversary's confidential
information with him.2 64 In this situation, the court held the complaining
party must first demonstrate "that there were substantive conversations
between disqualified counsel and co-counsel, joint preparation for trial by
those counsel, or the apparent receipt by co-counsel of confidential infor-
mation. '2 65 If this showing is made, a rebuttable presumption arises that
disqualified counsel shared the imputed confidential information with co-
counsel.266 Co-counsel then has the burden of rebutting the presumption
with evidence that disqualified counsel did not disclose any confidential
information to him.267
257. See American Home Prods., 985 S.W.2d at 75.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 77.
261. See id.
262. See id. Of course, disqualification is also required if the nonlawyer actually shares
confidential information with co-counsel. See id.
263. See id.. at 77-78. The court also noted that even if the nonlawyer and co-counsel
communicated about matters from which the nonlawyer should have been screened by her
new employer, disqualification still would not be required if the communications were
solely from co-counsel to the nonlawyer. See id. at 78.
264. See id. at 79.
265. See id. at 81.
266. See id.
267. See id. The court further held that party seeking disqualification is not entitled to
broadly pierce the attorney-client and work product privileges that might exist between
disqualified counsel and co-counsel. See id. The court cautioned, however, that if it later
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In re Users System Services, Inc.2 68 posed the question "whether a law-
yer should be disqualified from continuing to represent a litigant in a civil
case for meeting with an opposing party, at the party's request, if prior to
the meeting the party stated that he was no longer represented by coun-
sel, but his former attorney had not moved to withdraw from the case."
26 9
The supreme court answered no, holding that so long as the attorney for
the plaintiff had no reason to disbelieve that one of the defendants had
discharged his counsel, then the attorney was not required to confirm the
defendant's statements with opposing counsel or await the latter's formal
withdrawal as counsel of record in the litigation.2 70 The court further
noted that, even if the attorney's actions could be viewed as a violation of
the "spirit" of the so-called anti-contact rule,2 71 the remaining defendants
were not prejudiced and, therefore, disqualification would be inappropri-
ate in any event.
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
The supreme court examined the proper application of "the Rule ' 272 in
Drilex Systems, Inc. v. Flores.2 73 The defendant in that case invoked the
Rule, but then let one of its testifying experts, Acock, remain in the
courtroom during the testimony of plaintiffs' first witness. 274 Moreover,
after hearing that testimony, Acock then talked to the witness as well as
another expert.2 7 5 The trial court excluded Acock's testimony, and the
court of appeals affirmed.2 76
The supreme court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in
excluding Acock's testimony. 277 The court noted that once the Rule is
invoked, all non-exempt witnesses must be placed thereunder and ex-
cluded from the courtroom; the burden is on a party seeking to exempt a
witness from the Rule to establish that the witness's presence is essential
to its presentation of the case.2 78 Although such an exemption is often
becomes apparent in discovery or at trial that co-counsel possesses the adversary's confi-
dential information, then discovery of the source of the information should be allowed
notwithstanding those privileges. See id. at 81-82.
268. 42 TEX. SUp. CT. J. 836 (June 24, 1999).
269. Id.
270. See id. at 838-39.
271. DISCIPLINARY RULE 4.02(a) states:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause or encourage another to
communicate about the subject of the representation with a person, organization of entity
of government the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer regarding that sub-
ject, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 4.02(a).
272. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 267 and TEX. R. EVID. 614 (describing procedure for swearing
in trial witnesses and excluding them from the courtroom).
273. 1 S.W.3d 112 (Tex. 1999).
274. See id. at 115.
275. See id. at 116.
276. See id.
277. See id. The court also held that the excluded testimony would have been cumula-
tive in any event. See id.
278. See id. at 117.
1374 [Vol. 53
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
granted for expert witnesses, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that all experts are automatically exempt.279 Because the defendant had
not sought to exempt Acock from the Rule, and Acock violated the Rule
by remaining in the courtroom and discussing the case with other wit-
nesses, the trial court had the discretion to exclude his testimony.280 In-
deed, the court held exclusion was proper even though the trial court had
not expressly placed Acock under the Rule or instructed him not to dis-
cuss the case with others.281
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28282 allows individuals and entities do-
ing business under an assumed name to sue and be sued in that name.2 83
In Chilkewitz v. Morton L Hyson, M.D., P.A., 284 a medical malpractice
case, the plaintiff first sued Morton I. Hyson, M.D., individually, only to
find out after limitations had run that Dr. Hyson was not personally in-
volved in the events in question, and that Morton I. Hyson, M.D., P.A.
("P.A."), was the proper party.285 When the plaintiff then tried to avail
himself of Rule 28's provisions, pointing out that there was some evi-
dence that the P.A. did business under the assumed name Morton I. Hy-
son, M.D., the association argued this was an attempt to toll limitation in
violation of section 10.01 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act.2 86 The supreme court rejected this argument, holding that
"Rule 28 is not a tolling provision when a party is sued in the name under
which it conducts business and that party has actual notice of the suit. '287
Because the P.A. did business under Dr. Hyson's name, it was party to
the suit from the outset, albeit under that assumed name, and Rule 28 did
not operate to toll the statute of limitations.288
Non-discovery sanctions were the subject of several decisions during
the Survey period. In Roberts v. Golden Crest Waters, Inc.,289 the trial
court struck all of the plaintiffs' witnesses and then dismissed the case
with prejudice based upon the plaintiff's failure to file a required pretrial
statement and list of witnesses.2 90 Although the court of appeals recog-
nized a trial court's authority to impose sanctions for the failure to com-
ply with a pretrial order, it held that a "death penalty" sanction, such as
dismissal, must be consistent with the standards announced by the su-
279. See id. at 118.
280. See id. at 119. The court noted that it may sometimes be an abuse of discretion to
exclude a witness for violation the Rule. See id. at 120. The defendant did not argue abuse
of discretion on appeal, however, only that Acock was exempt from the Rule. See id.
281. See id. The supreme court stated that having invoked the Rule, the defendant was
obliged to ensure that its witnesses complied. See id.
282. TEX. R. Civ. P. 28.
283. See id.
284. 43 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 52 (Oct. 21, 1999).
285. See id. at 52-53.
286. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. at 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Chilkewitz,
43 TEX. Sup. CT. J. at 53-54.
287. See id. at 55.
288. See id.
289. 1 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.).
290. See id. at *1.
2000] 1375
SMU LAW REVIEW
preme court in the discovery context. 291 Applying these standards, the
court held that the trial court abused its discretion because there was no
indication that the plaintiffs themselves (as opposed to their attorneys)
had a role in the sanctionable conduct, there was no prejudice to the de-
fendants, and the trial court never considered lesser sanctions.292
The appellate courts also reversed the imposition of sanctions in Mc-
Whorter v. Sheller293 and Texas Parks and Wildlife Department v. Da-
vis. 2 94 In McWhorter, the trial judge sanctioned the defendant's attorney
for secretly tape recording a telephone conference with the judge and
opposing counsel, in which the judge communicated her findings of fact
and conclusions of law.295 The attorney indicated that she recorded the
conference so that an order could be prepared accurately reflecting the
judge's ruling, and the appellate court noted the trial judge did not find
that the attorney had acted in bad faith.296 Thus, while emphasizing that
the attorney's conduct was inappropriate,2 97 the court of appeals reversed
the imposition of sanctions.2 98
In Texas Parks and Wildlife Department v. Davis,2 99 the trial court sanc-
tioned the defendant for allegedly failing to negotiate in good faith during
court-ordered mediation.300 The court of appeals reversed the sanction,
holding that while parties may be compelled to attend mediation, they
cannot be compelled to negotiate in good faith or settle their disputes. 30'
In doing so, the court expressly declined to follow a contrary decision
from one of its sister courts of appeal. 302
Under both the Federal Arbitration Act 30 3 and the Texas Arbitration
Act,304 one of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award is "evident
partiality" on the part of a neutral arbitrator. 30 5 The Texas Supreme
Court has held that evident partiality is proven if the arbitrator failed to
"disclose facts which might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable
291. See id. (citing Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917
(Tex. 1991)).
292. See Roberts, 1999 WL 668814 at *2.
293. 993 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
294. 988 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
295. See McWhorter, 993 S.W.2d at 788.
296. See id. at 789.
297. See id. at 788-89 & n. 2 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 8.04(A)(3)
and 59 TEX. BAR J. 181 (Ethics Opinion 514 (Feb. 1996)).
298. See McWhorter, 993 S.W.2d at 789. The court warned, however, that attorneys
who engage in the same conduct in the future probably will not escape sanctions. See id.
299. 988 S.W.2d 370.
300. See id. at 375.
301. See id. The court appeared to rely on the statutory provisions for confidentiality of
mediation sessions as one of the bases for its decision. See id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. 154.073 (Vernon Supp. 2000)).
302. See Davis, 988 S.W.2d at 375 (citing Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d
657 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied)).
303. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1, et seq. (West 1999).
304. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001, et seq. (Vernon Supp. 2000).
305. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.014.
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impression of the arbitrator's partiality. '30 6 In Thomas James Associates,
Inc. v. Owens,30 7 the court held that an arbitrator's failure to disclose that
he had been sued as a result of his service on an arbitration panel did not
satisfy this standard.308 Although the arbitration respondent in Owens
argued that this experience might cause the arbitrator to "'bend over
backwards' to favor future claimants," the court noted that the opposite
argument was equally plausible. 30 9 Conversely, in Texas Commerce Bank
v. Universal Technical Institute of Texas, Inc.,310 the court held that an
arbitrator's failure to disclose that he had previously represented one of
the parties in a $1.5 million lawsuit might create a reasonable impression
of partiality and, therefore, justified vacating the arbitration award at
issue. 311
306. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629, 636 (Tex. 1997) (discussed
in A. Erin Dwyer, et al., Texas Civil Procedure, 51 SMU L. REV. 1383, 1415 (1998)).
307. No. 05-97-00273-CV, 1999 WL 669583 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 30, 1999, no pet.
h.).
308. See id. at *4.
309. See id.
310. 985 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
311. See id. at 681.
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